



As with many legal disputes concerning Europe’s bloody colonial past, conversations
about the Ovaherero and Nama’s right to reparations from Germany often reach a
dead end at the mention of intertemporal international law. Accordingly, one should
judge the past by the legal standards of its time, not by our modern perceptions.
As the rules of the past were mostly nasty and brutish, the argument goes, the
victims of colonial injustice and their descendants – “regrettably” – do not possess
a right to reparations. This leaves their claims for redress of past atrocities, the
consequences of which often reach well into the present, at the mercy of their
former colonizers. A puzzling reversal of roles ensues: those who should beg the
victim groups for forgiveness find themselves in the comfortable position of trading
compensation for forgiveness, and those who might grant forgiveness as an act of
grace beg for the grace of reparations. All this results from rules of intertemporal law.
It is therefore high time to decolonize them. To change the rules entirely would – as
the reader may guess – require the consent of all states, including the colonizers,
and is therefore unlikely.
But there is another avenue, well known in theory though rarely used in practice.
Legal interpretation offers tools to critically reread international law’s past without
changing it. It starts with observing that international law consists of language
(treaties) and past practice. Accordingly, it does not work like a rack wheel, but
like a chameleon. It changes its color with the context, and we might see widely
different colors from different angles. Illustrative of this is an anecdote about Samuel
Maharero. When some Germans asked to buy his land, he allegedly gave them two
buckets of sand. For the Germans, “land” was a determined part of the surface of
the earth, while for Samuel Maharero, “land” could not be owned in that sense. Such
ambiguity is intrinsic to many concepts in international law and the subject of much
controversy. It sits uncomfortably with former colonial powers’ defiant assertions that
there are no legitimate claims to reparations.
A critical reading of international law can undermine such assertions. It exposes
disputes among lawyers of different colonial powers, each coincidentally invoking the
rules that best fit their country’s interests; or disputes among lawyers of one country,
where the dominant view is not necessarily the best informed or most consistent.
It reveals that the colonized territories did not meet the test for terra nullius (a no
man’s land ready for occupation), as the colonizers’ ignorance of the social and
political organization of the colonized cannot rebound to the disadvantage of the
latter. It investigates what a neutral observer would see as a protection agreement,
or selling a piece of land. It undercuts the assertion that, at the time, international
law was entirely separate from moral convictions. Well into the second half of the
19th century, international lawyers, for lack of precedent and shared practice, often
- 1 -
looked to sources of moral philosophy to determine what the law was. Finally, it also
exposes the fact that 19th-century international law was presented as a just order not
only to serve, but also to appease colonizers’ increasingly self-conscious and often
skeptical home audiences.
Is the prospect of critically reinterpreting international law’s past utopian? Maybe.
But it is certainly no less daunting than the assertion that some of the most heinous
atrocities were legal. If former colonial powers were serious about setting the record
straight, decolonizing intertemporal law would be an adequate starting point.
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